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THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF "ENFORCING" PEACE
EDWIN BORCHARDt
JUST in what respect is the United Nations an improvement over the
League of Nations? Both of them have their justification in the as-
surance of peace which a bewildered humanity anxiously seeks. Both
of them purport to advance the cause by enforcing peace upon the so-
called "aggressor." When the League sought to accomplish this aim in
Manchuria (1931), in Ethiopia (1935), in German reoccupation of the
Rhineland (1936), it found itself hampered by the fact that various
constituent members declined to go along. But the idea that force was
the "Open, Sesame" to peace was not abandoned. Finally, in 1939,
after Hitler had absorbed Austria (1938) and-despite the Munich
appeasement-Czechoslovakia as well (1939), while the League stood
by helpless, Russia invaded Finland, and the League manifested its
impotent displeasure and frustration by expelling the Soviet Govern-
ment. That seems to have been the last important activity of the
League.
Why it is assumed that the membership of the United States would
have changed this picture is not altogether clear, unless it be thought
that in the name of righteousness the United States can be induced to
fight on any and all occasions. At all events, when the time came to
organize a new League, because of Soviet disapproval of the old and
its waning prestige, the United States took the lead in organizing it
under the name of the United Nations. Its aims are the same as those
of the old League, except that the Military Staff Committee (Art. 47)
is to symbolize the military potency of the organization, and the ac-
knowledged exercise of the veto power by one of the Big Five assures
that nation of an immunity from the ministrations of the organization
machinery.
We have seen the United Nations in action for nearly a year. Only
an optimist would conclude that its deliberations on Iran and Spain
.constituted a contribution toward peace. Perhaps it will do better
hereafter. But, as in the case of the League, it seems that the less
political functions of the organization have more likelihood of ac-
complishment than the highly political, if not belligerent, enforcement
of peace.
The proposals for enforcing the peace announced at San Francisco
in 1945 are founded on the theory that peace can be "enforced" by
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"peace-loving," "sovereign" nations on recalcitrant states, called
"aggressors," in the game way that the non-conformist within a state is
subjected to arrest, judicial control and punishment. The fact that
states in the international constellation differ fundamentally from in-
dividuals in a municipal community, and that the method of and
procedure for controlling them must of necessity be entirely different,
has not been recognized by the seekers of a new world order, romantic
chasers of the international rainbow.
Enforcement under the Charter rests essentially upon armed coercion
by the Big Three, drawing support from the smaller member states.
The theorists, in their attempt to produce the new order by coercion,
are driving out of existence international law, the only law that is
able to survive among a congeries of states, none of whom is entitled
to pass judgment on others, and none of whom is able to enforce its
judgment without inviting war. The theorists thus propose to "en-
force" peace by war at a time when international relations are more
irreconcilable than ever; yet they expect the promotion of law to ac-
company this essentially anarchistic process. This is the state of mind
that the 20th century has attained. Perhaps two world wars, with
their destruction of human values, were too great a shock to permit
the survival of reason.
What is now happening follows from the acceptance of an assump-
tion, made by gentlemen like Woodrow Wilson, that the world and its
processes can be changed by a new charter or league. That the world's
distant places are now more accessible has promoted the propaganda
that an international organization is essential to the world's survival.
The world has undoubtedly shrunk, but the nature of the state and
the relations between states have not thereby been changed. Indeed,
international propinquity has promoted nationalism and thus increased
the dangers of conflict. Instead of methods to allay the growing dis-
temper, predominant force or compulsion, a counsel of despair, is the
only solution offered to us.
The Founders of this nation had before them in a much more fav-
orable setting the problem of enforcing the Constitution upon the con-
stituent states of this Union and firmly rejected the suggestion that
force be employed on the ground that it would break up the Union and
merely eventuate in war. But this fact is lost upon their successors.
Madison remarked that: "The practicability of making laws, with
coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies, had been exploded
on all hands." I Hamilton characterized the proposal as ". . . little
less romantic than the monster-taming spirit, attributed to the fabu-
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lous heroes and demi-gods of antiquity." 2 There is no element of the
proposed theory of punishing "aggressors" which is not contested by
history and disproved by experience.
Many schemes for organizing peace have dotted the centuries since
the Abb6 de St. Pierre announced his unworkable plan. These schemes
differed from the League of Nations in that the latter was adopted by
statesmen and not in that it was any more valid. Such schemes fail
because of contradictions inherent in "enforcing" peace and because
they falsely assume that sovereign states can sit in judgment or agree
on the meaning of such an undefinable term as "aggressor" and then
carry out the judgment without upsetting the world. Nations perhaps
should abandon their sovereignty, which in many respects is outdated,
but no nations seem ready to do so, least of all the great powers who
have sponsored the United Nations. As Elihu Root once said about a
sensible solution to another problem, "they just won't do it."
Whereas international law was built on the theory of the equality of
states, the new scheme involves an essential denial of this equality by
making power the test of rank. Yet the maintenance of sovereignty,
upon which the constituent states insist, is incompatible with regulating
the conduct of states by strengthening the sinews of dictated law. On
the contrary, the law that can prevail among sovereign states is not a
law dictated by superior to inferior, as is the case inside a state, or in
municipal law, as we call it, but only a system to which states agree,
whether created by custom or by treaty among equals. The rules of
neutrality, so created, but now flouted as never before, constituted a
means by which society could control wars, limit their area, and restore
a healthy peace. This time-tested protection of society against mutual
destruction is now ostensibly abandoned, although no nation seems
to have abrogated its neutrality laws, and the survivors are likely to
insist upon neutrality in the civil wars that are in the offing. Whereas
non-intervention was the keynote both of international law and Amer-
ican policy, universal intervention in other people's local affairs and in
matters of which an understanding is quite wanting is now presented as
the desired key to international tranquility. The idea of enforcing
peace in analogy to a municipal system is only theoretically tolerable
when a superstate controls all others, a condition which it is impossible
to assume. There can be no superstate unless the Big Three fight it
out for supremacy, and, as yet, even our wild theorists have produced
no school to suggest this course. In fact, we are dealing with a con-
geries of sovereign states, and if the Big Three profess to be above the
law, laying down the rules-most likely their whims-for states of
lesser breed, long docility can hardly be assumed.
The other alternative is that sovereignty be abandoned to a federa-
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tion, such as the United States, with the federation having power to
enforce upon individuals the constitutional rules of the federation.
Since Europe is unable to organize such a sensible organization inside a
continent which should be cohesive, it is hardly to be assumed that the
disparate states of the world are ready to form a federation. Only
blind faith supports the belief that order can be maintained in the
world by a thinly disguised military alliance of the three largest Pow-
ers. It takes such faith to believe, against history's clear warnings, that
Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, facing the problems that
their financial and social conditions make inexorable, are likely long
to see the future in the same light. Early renewal of war is not proba-
ble; of this, exhaustion is the principal guaranty, but the growth of
regionalism seems likely, with small states, while still boasting of their
sovereignty, diminishing to the position of protectorates of larger
units. That imperialism will suffer a serious check under this power
system seems unlikely. As force grows in importance, the law recedes.
The assumption of numerous theorists that the weakness of inter-
national law is due to the lack of force behind it is responsible for much
of the sorry thinking of the present day. International law is a primi-
tive system, not because it lacks the support of force but because it
deals with sovereign states who cannot be coerced by other states
without entailing war. There must be a certain agreement on the law,
at least among the majority. But the law gains its strength through
practice, invocation by foreign offices and application by tribunals.
If such an epithet as "aggressor" under the new theory is made the
test of status and action, it must be assumed that the judging nations
in the Security Council-at least the large ones-will be able to agree
on the meaning of such an uncertain term, not merely when applied
to a particular nation, now, but also when applied to nations behaving
similarly in the long future. Yet experience teaches us that agreement
is exceedingly doubtful, since the judgment is reached not on impartial
criteria but on subjective if political grounds, including self-interest,
association, commitments, alliances, and other considerations far from
legal. It is not possible to conceive that Great Britain would consider
one of its dominions an "aggressor." It is not possible to imagine that
Russia would find one of its satellite states to be an "aggressor," which
presupposes Russian inability to control the recalcitrant itself. It is not
possible to assume the continuance of the inter-American system if
the United States should declare one of the constituent states to be an
itaggressor."
Realizing the political nature of the judgment and the consequent
unlikelihood of agreement, it has been suggested that the judgment as
to who is an "aggressor" be left with the Court of International Justice,
a body ostensibly impartial. It is blandly assumed that the Court
would assume jurisdiction of such a case. Acceptance of such jurisdic-
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tion would be likely to terminate the Court's existence, since the Court
depends for its existence upon the cooperation of the constituent mem-
bers. Even the Customs Union case,' which was based on Article 88
of the Treaty of St. Germain, strained the virility of the Court and did
much to shake its authority in Europe.
Another weakness inherent in "enforcing" peace is revealed by
recognition that "to outlaw aggression" is, by and large, an attractive
formulation of "to maintain the status quo." The peace to be "en-
forced," under the facts .of economic life, present as well as historic,
must perforce be the result of war, and must immobilize geography as
it emerged from war. In so far as the peace imposed upon the van-
quished be not statesmanlike, i.e., conforming to the new political
conditions, it must create malaise and discontent certain to break out
into open dissatisfaction and conflict. The nullification of conquest as a
source of title cannot be effective without the creation of a substitute
method for effecting boundary and economic adjustments.
The philosophy which identifies the preservation of peace with the
maintenance of the status quo and favors hounding the non-conformist
has, however, disastrous consequences. A good physician attempts first
to establish the nature of his patient, his constitution, his allergies, his
habits, his weaknesses, and then fashions his therapeutics to harmonize
with the natural tendencies of the patient. But by prescribing the use
or threat of force against a nation that finds the status quo intolerable,
the international physicians are abandoning diagnosis. Independent
national entities do not naturally have the same political objectives,
internal or external, and are likely to drift into a balance of power-
where there is political interest-and not unity. Coercion or its threat
promotes disunity. Compulsion to observe a status quo-whether
called "peace" or "international law"-is a politically comprehensible
device, but experience shows the device has had no success as a con-
ciliator or pacifier. If employed against a nation in possession of arms
or capable of resistance, it is likely to have unhappy results. Inter-
national relations cannot be mechanized or regimented. Especially
is this true if peace treaties are drawn, like many European treaties,
not to reflect prevailing political trends, heal wounds and restore the
lost equilibrium, but to impose unnatural conditions. In an industrial
age such treaties tend to produce social diseases, peculiarly cancerous
in their virulence. In the quest for peace a study of history and psy-
chology is a more important asset than a knowledge of law or political
mechanics; the emphasis on enforcement gives it a misplaced r6le in
the drama.
The identification of peace with the status quo has other results. It is
responsible for muddying intellectual clarity and the understanding of
3. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No.41 (Advisory Opinion, 1931).
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history. To it we owe the chameleonic epithet "aggressor," which is
applied selectively to those particular disturbers of the status quo
whom the dominant states happen to dislike. It is responsible for the
war-spreading conception that by remaining out of wars, when the
dominant states are in, the neutral is in some way guilty of immorality.
Veneration of the status quo, backed by coercion, adds up to the prac-
tice of intervention, now common to many nations in spite of lip-service
occasionally paid to non-intervention. It is responsible for the doctrine
of non-recognition of political facts, however inexorable, if unwelcome
to the ruling nations. It is responsible for the doctrine of sanctions,
designed to bend nations to the will of the ruling group and carrying
behind it a whole flood of evils. It is responsible for that rigidity and
inflexibility of diplomacy, spiced by invective, which regards every
proposal to alter the status quo as prima facie intolerable, though there
is no exit in peaceful change. Such inflexibility is likely to be associated
with self-righteousness, calculated to evoke desperation and desperate
*men. As an incident to discountenancing neutrality-which over the
centuries had demonstrated its utility-the concept of an enforced
peace introduced into the language such ambiguous conceptions as
"non-belligerency," which seems to justify violations of neutrality
(i.e., law) while purporting to escape the risks of war and legal liability.
Thus, the confusion of peace with war, which at least the traditional
law had sought to distinguish clearly, is now accompanied by a whole
conglomeration of ambiguities, like "international police force," "just
war," "concern"-the jargon of "collective security"-which have
made political life uncertain and hardly encourage hope of a profitable
cooperation.
Instead of expending energy on "enforcing" peace, which is likely to
fail at the first impact with reality, it seems far more practical to rescue
what we can from a distracted and impoverished order by emphasizing:
1. The necessity of a workable and not too inflexible peace which will
permit all peoples to resume the thread of life;
2. The necessity of putting people in all countries back to work;
3. The necessity of knitting together sundered economic (including
fiscal) relations, by restoring trade with its collateral incidents and
apparatus, making a beginning at meeting the problcm of unfair
competition, and re-establishing gold or some substitute for gold
as an automatic compensatory device for meeting the balance of
payments;
4. The necessity of stimulating economic coordination in the form of
commodity agreements and exchanges which would deflate the
importance of boundaries, help to restore understanding, diminish
unfair competition, and make possible more constructive political
relations;
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5. The necessity of making the Economic and Social Council an
independent corporation, like the Bretton Woods Fund and Bank,
to coordinate the work of other economic and social agencies in the
-field of trade, production and consumption and human rights, so
as to enable it to survive any disorganization of the political Secu-
rity Council;
6. The necessity of curing embittered international relations by the
time-honored methods of diplomacy and by affording economic
opportunity, eschewing provocation, boycott, invective, and the
asstmed right to judge the morals of other people;
7. The necessity of foregoing the use of provocative terms which imply
discrimination, such as "peace-loving" nations, "aggressor" and
similar terms of self-praise or opprobrium;
8. The necessity of curtailing if not abandoning sanctions, an instru-
mentality of economic warfare, which widens the gap between the
possessing nations and others and constitutes a constant incentive
to conflict;
9. The necessity of foregoing intervention in the external and internal
affairs of other nations and returning to the tried methods of non-
intervention;
10. The necessity of restoring the rule of law which the modem con-
ceit of collective security has shattered;
11. The necessity of amending the Charter in the following respects:
a. That it be made universal, open to all nations willing to sub-
scribe to the Charter;
b. That it be deprived of its war-making threat and function and
become an assembly for the consideration of mutual problems,
notably in the economic sphere, and become the agency for recom-
mending and, if possible without force, effecting peaceful change
by a two-thirds vote in the Assembly and in the Security Council;
c. That the status of the Assembly be changed to become a
governing body of equal status with the Security Council and not
merely a debating society;
d. That the amending process be changed so as to disable one
of the Big Three or Five from frustrating amendments, which
should be made by a two-thirds vote of Assembly and Council;
e. That no one member of the Big Five retain the opportunity
to prevent the consideration of any question or any action affecting
itself or another state by its negative vote;
f. That the profession to direct force be eliminated, since the
promise of force merely begets counter-force and defeats any hope
of the limitation of armaments.
The writer is under no illusions as to the feasibility of amending the
Charter, since a veto from one of the Big Five suffices to prevent all
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consideration of the subject. But unless this is done, and with reason-
able promptness, the members of the United Nations are not likely to
remain long "united" or to achieve the professed aims of the Charter.
If that should prove to be the case, the Charter will take its place vith
the Covenant of the League of Nations as another device marking the
disappointment of man's hopes for a better regulation of his inter-
national relations.
